



Registrar

National Electric Power Regulatory Authority Islamic Republic of Pakistan

NEPRA Tower, Attaturk Avenue (East), G-5/1, Islamabad.

Tel: +92-51-9206500, Fax: +92-51-2600026

Web: www.nepra.org.pk, E-mail: registrar@nepra.org.pk

No. NEPRA/SA(M&E)/LAD-03/19697

November 17, 2025

Chief Executive Officer,
Gujranwala Electric Power Company Limited (GEPCO),
565/A, Model Town, G.T Road,
Gujranwala

SUBJECT: ORDER OF THE AUTHORITY IN THE MATTER OF SHOW CAUSE NOTICE
ISSUED TO GEPCO UNDER SECTION 27B OF THE NEPRA ACT READ WITH
OTHER RELEVANT RULES & REGULATIONS OF THE NEPRA ACT
REGARDING FATAL ACCIDENTS OCCURRED IN GEPCO DURING THE
FISCAL YEAR 2023-2024

Please find enclosed herewith, the Order of the Authority (total 14 pages) in the subject matter for information and compliance.

Enclosure: As above

Wasim Anwar Bhinder
(Wasim Anwar Bhinder)

NATIONAL ELECTRIC POWER REGULATORY AUTHORITY

ORDER

IN THE MATTER OF SHOW CAUSE NOTICE ISSUED TO GEPCO UNDER SECTION 27B OF THE NEPRA ACT READ WITH OTHER RELEVANT RULES & REGULATIONS OF THE NEPRA ACT REGARDING FATAL ACCIDENTS OCCURRED IN GEPCO DURING THE FISCAL YEAR 2023-2024.

1. Gujranwala Electric Power Company (the "Licensee") is a distribution company that has been granted distribution licensee No. DL/04/2023 by the National Electric Power Regulatory Authority (the "Authority") under sections 20 and 21 of the Regulation of Generation, Transmission and Distribution of Electric Power Act, 1997 ("NEPRA Act"), for providing of the distribution services of electric power in its service territory.

2. Background:

2.1. As per Sections 7.45.3 and 7.45.4 of the Power Safety Code 2021, the Licensee is required to report any incident involving an employee, contractor, or member of the general public to NEPRA within 24 hours through the NEPRA Incident Reporting Portal. Accordingly, the Licensee has submitted details of eight (8) accidents that occurred during the fiscal year (FY) 2023-2024 within Licensee's service territory, resulting in the loss of nine (9) human lives.

3. Summary of the Investigation:

3.1. The Honorable Authority took serious notice of fatalities and constituted an Investigation Committee (the "IC") under Section 27A of the NEPRA Act. The IC was mandated to determine whether any violation or substantive non-compliance of the provision of law and applicable documents have been committed by the Licensee, and to ascertain the associated facts and cause(s) of actions. Accordingly, notice issued to the Licensee vide letter No. NEPRA/DG(M&E)/LAD-03/14768-69 dated Sep 20, 2024.

3.2. The IC conducted investigation and submitted its report before the Honorable Authority.


3.2.1. Employee Accidents

Direct Cause: Electrocutation

No.	Employee Name	Common Root Causes
1	Mr. Tariq Naeem (LM-I) GEPCO cannot be held responsible	• Failure to obtain PTW. • Failure to use PPE. • Lack of Supervision.
2	Mr. Zaka Ullah (ALM)	
3	Mr. Umer Farooq (ALM)	

Direct Cause: Fall from Height

4	Mr. Muhammad Shahbaz (LM-I)	• Failure to obtain PTW. • Failure to Arrange Proper Equipment • Lack of Supervision
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3.2.2. Public Accidents

Direct Cause: Electrocution

No	Contractor & Public Name	Root Causes
5	Mr. Imran Khan (Public)	• Lack of Consumer Cable Management. • Failure to Identify and Rectify Deteriorated Cable. • Lack of Planning & Supervision. • Digital Relay Failure. • Absence of fixed earthing. • Lack of Preventive Maintenance.
6	Mr. Sardar Wali (Public)	• Lack of Preventive Maintenance. • Improper Handling of Relay Earth Fault of Broken Conductor Indications. • Lack of Complaint Reporting by Public.

No.	Employee Name.	Common Root Causes
7	Samar Abbas (Public)	• Building Construction Beneath the Lines. • Inadequate Safety Clearances. • New Connection Installation. • Lack of Public Awareness.

Direct Cause: Transformer Failure

8	Ms. Rafia Chishti (Public)	• Inadequate Preventive Maintenance of Transformer.
	Ms. Hania (Public)	


3.3. After detail deliberations by the Honorable Authority, GEPCO is held responsible for seven (7) accidents based on the investigation report and directed to initiate legal proceedings against the Licensee under Section 27B of the NEPRA Act.

Sr. No.	Description	Accident	Fatality	Accident Responsibility	
				GEPCO	Non GEPCO
1.	Employee	4	4	3	1
2.	Contractor	0	0	0	0
3.	Public	4	5	4	0
Total		8	9	7	1

4. Show Cause Notice:

4.1. A Show Cause Notice bearing No. NEPRA/DG(M&E)/LAD-03/3865 was issued to Licensee on March 13, 2025. The key highlights of the Show Cause Notice are summarized below:

7. **WHEREAS**, according to the Investigation Report, eight (8) accidents occurred within the Licensee's service territory during the fiscal year 2023-2024, tragically resulting in the loss of nine (9) lives. The investigation revealed three direct causes of these fatal accidents: electrocution (6 cases), fall from height (1 case) and transformer failure (1 case). Further analysis of these three direct causes uncovered four common



root causes among others: lack of supervision, failure to obtain permits to work, failure to use personal protective equipment and lack of preventive maintenance, highlighting severe deficiencies in GEPCO's management and safety practices; and

8. **WHEREAS**, according to the Investigation Report, it revealed that two (2) accidents of GEPCO employees occurred due to electrocution, primarily caused by failure to obtain a PTW, failure to use Personal Protective Equipment (PPE), and lack of supervision. These factors resulted in the fatalities of Mr. Zaka Ullah (ALM) and Mr. Umer Farooq (ALM). The Licensee has failed to adhere to statutory obligations, principles, and parameters established for prudent utility practices. Consequently, the Licensee is in violation of NEPRA Act, Section 21(2)(f), which outlines the duties and responsibilities of distribution licensees, Article 19 of the Distribution License, pertaining to compliance with Health, Safety, and Environmental Standards, read with Rule 4(g) & Overall Standard 7 (Safety – OS7) of the NEPRA Performance Standards (Distribution) Rules, 2005, DDC 4 Design Code- Earthing of the Distribution Code, Clause SR 4 of the Safety Management Criteria and PR 1 of Protection System Practices and System Coordination provisions under the Distribution Code, Clauses 7.12.5, 7.15.1, 7.15.5, 7.20.1, 7.20.4, 7.22.1, and 7.25.1 of Power Safety Code 2021 and Section 12.2 of the Chapter 12 of the Consumer Service Manual, related to Safety and Security; and
9. **WHEREAS**, according to the Investigation Report, it revealed that an accident of GEPCO employee occurred due to fall from height, primarily caused by failure to obtain PTW, failure to arrange proper equipment and lack of supervision, which resulted in the fatality of Mr. Muhammad Shabbaz (LM-I). The Licensee has failed to adhere to statutory obligations, principles, and parameters established for prudent utility practices. Consequently, the Licensee is in violation of NEPRA Act, Section 21(2)(f), which outlines the duties and responsibilities of distribution licensees, Article 19 of the Distribution License, pertaining to compliance with Health, Safety, and Environmental Standards, read with Rule 4(g) & Overall Standard 7 (Safety – OS7) of the NEPRA Performance Standards (Distribution) Rules, 2005, DDC 4 Design Code- Earthing of the Distribution Code, Clause SR 4 of the Safety Management Criteria and PR 1 of Protection System Practices and System Coordination provisions under the Distribution Code, Clauses 7.12.5, 7.15.1, 7.15.5, 7.20.1, 7.20.4, 7.22.1, and 7.25.1 of Power Safety Code 2021 and Section 12.2 of the Chapter 12 of the Consumer Service Manual, related to Safety and Security; and
10. **WHEREAS**, according to the Investigation Report, it revealed that three (3) public accidents occurred due to electrocution, primarily caused by lack of planning & supervision, lack of preventive maintenance, lack of consumer cable management, failure to identify and rectify deteriorated cable, and absence of fixed earthing in the cases of Mr. Imran Khan (Public). In the case of Mr. Sardar Wali (Public), the causes included, lack of preventive maintenance, and improper handling of relay earth fault of broken conductor indications. Similarly, in the case of Samar Abbas (Public), the causes included, building construction beneath the lines, inadequate safety clearances and new connection installation. The Licensee has failed to



adhere to statutory obligations, principles, and parameters established for prudent utility practices. Consequently, the Licensee is in violation of NEPRA Act, Section 21(2)(f), which outlines the duties and responsibilities of distribution licensees, Article 19 of the Distribution License, pertaining to compliance with Health, Safety, and Environmental Standards, read with Rule 4(g) & Overall Standard 7 (Safety – OS7) of the NEPRA Performance Standards (Distribution) Rules, 2005, DDC 4 Design Code- Earthing of the Distribution Code, Clause SR 4 of the Safety Management Criteria and PR 1 of Protection System Practices and System Coordination provisions under the Distribution Code, Clauses 7.12.5, 7.15.1, 7.15.2, 7.15.5, 7.20.1, 7.20.4, 7.22.1, 7.25.1, and of Power Safety Code 2021 and Section 12.2.6, and 12.4.9 of Chapter 12 of the Consumer Service Manual, related to Safety and Security; and

11. **WHEREAS**, according to the Investigation Report, it revealed that an accident of public occurred due to transformer failure, primarily caused by inadequate preventive maintenance of transformer in the cases of Ms. Rafia Chishti (Public) and Ms. Hania (Public), resulting in severe burns of them. The Licensee has failed to adhere to statutory obligations, principles, and parameters established for prudent utility practices. Consequently, the Licensee is in violation of NEPRA Act, Section 21(2)(f), which outlines the duties and responsibilities of distribution licensees, Article 19 of the Distribution License, pertaining to compliance with Health, Safety, and Environmental Standards, read with Rule 4(g) & Overall Standard 7 (Safety – OS7) of the NEPRA Performance Standards (Distribution) Rules, 2005, Clause SR 4 of the Safety Management Criteria of Distribution Code, Clause 7.16.4 of Power Safety Code 2021 and Section 12.2 of the Chapter 12 of the Consumer Service Manual, related to Safety and Security.

5. Response by Licensee

- 5.1. The Licensee, vide letter No. 78581 dated March 28, 2025, submitted its response to the NEPRA Show Cause Notice. The key highlights of the Licensee's response are summarized below:

Para#8: The causes of these two accidents were due to carelessness, negligence and non-compliance of SOP on the part of deceased and their work incharge/supervisor. The disciplinary action against all responsible officers/officials has also been taken considering them indirect responsible. Keeping in view the ground reality and root cause the brief of each case along with its reason are given hereafter. Mr. Zaka-Ullah ALM under GEPCO Operation Sub Division Vanike Tararr District Hafizabad touched with 11KV dropper and fell down while set righting broken LT line of tube well connection. He had not availed the permit.

Mr. Umar Farooq ALM under GEPCO Operation Sub Division Aroop District Gujranwala gripped the neutral wire of LT line and received Electric shock due to back feed from other energized source, the root cause was non-availing PTW as well as not installing temporary earth. So, both



accidents took place due to personal carelessness of the officials whereas GEPCO had arranged all required PPE/T&P and trainings.

Para#9: Mr. Muhammad Shabbaz LM-I under GEPCO Operation Sub Division G.T Road Gujranwala was connecting the broken 11 KV jumper of one phase of 50 KVA Transformer with disconnecting stick (D-Operating rod) by climbing up the bamboo ladder. As PTW was not availed and line was energized, therefore during connecting the jumpers a spark appeared and he lost his balance and fell down on metaled road. All the necessary T&P & PPE was available in the office of SDO G.T. Road Sub Division. But due to carelessness/ over-looking of the official himself, the same were not utilized. Hence this is a personal behavior/ approach of the employee whereas GEPCO had provided all possible resources and trainings for the workers.

Para#10: As far as public accidents are concerned, where electrocution of Mr. Muhammad Imran occurred due to short circuited LT Tubular Pole installed in street and dipped in rain water. The earthing of the pole had become in effective due to ageing. The situation became more hazardous due to blockage of sewerage line and floating of rain water. The circumstances exacerbated the situation, not controlled under GEPCO, so the deceased received electric shock from energized water surrounding the pole. The current in the pole had never been reported by any one from the vicinity.

Another victim i.e. Mr. Sardar Wali came into contact with broken 11 KV Conductor at night while coming to his home on motor bike. The motor bike of deceased had no front/ head light due to which he could not see the hanging broken conductor at night and touched with that. The scrap carrying on motor bike caught fire which exacerbated the situation and he succumbed to burns.

Similarly, Mr. Sammar Abbas lost his life due to touching with already existing 66 kV Transmission Line while picking cricket ball from the roof top of the house, constructed illegally under existing transmission line. Notice was issued to the owner of the illegally constructed building but he turned a deaf ear.

Para#11: The death of Mst Rafia and Hania (mother and daughter) occurred due to contacting with flames of burnt transformer which comes under responsibility and there is no intentional and deliberate act of negligence. As evident from detailed inquiry that due to internal fault the spark might have produced at 200 KVA Transformer but the beneath parked motor bikes at the occasion of marriage function caught fire and the situation worsen when the fire spread at high intensity. The deceased were attending the marriage function in close proximity of Transformer. In this regard the para-1 of affidavit given by the father of Rafia is very clear stating therein that marriage celebration function in close proximity of transformer was one the reason of incident. Hence the GEPCO may not be considered for sole responsible for above fatalities.



6. Hearing:

6.1. The Authority considered the response of the Licensee and decided to provide an opportunity for a hearing to the Licensee under Regulation 4(11) of the NEPRA (Fine) Regulations, 2021. Accordingly, hearing notice No. NEPRA/R/DG(M&E)/LAD-03/10984 was issued to Licensee on July 17, 2025 and hearing was held on July 24, 2025. During the hearing, the CEO of Licensee, along with his team made the following submissions:

- 6.1.1. Licensee stated that accidents involving its employees primarily occurred due to their own negligence or mistakes.
- 6.1.2. GEPCO affirmed that earthing has been provided on both HT and LT poles.
- 6.1.3. Employees are provided with sufficient and good-quality PPE and T&P.
- 6.1.4. GEPCO stated that safety hazards are being rectified on a regular basis to prevent accidents.
- 6.1.5. GEPCO reported that safety seminars are being conducted regularly.
- 6.1.6. The CEO informed that regular safety messages are being sent to employees to alert them about potential hazards.
- 6.1.7. GEPCO submitted that compensation has been provided to the families of both employees and members of the public who lost their lives in accidents.

7. Findings/Analysis:

In light of GEPCO's response to the Show Cause Notice and the submissions made during the hearing, following are the findings:

- 7.1. GEPCO's submission in response to the Show Cause Notice (SCN) has been thoroughly reviewed and found that, multiple employees and public fatalities resulting from serious lapses in electrical safety and infrastructure management. GEPCO's submission is not only factually weak, but legally invalid. The attempt to shift blame to uncontrollable circumstances or the victims themselves reflects a deeply disturbing disregard for safety obligations for preventable accidents.
- 7.2. GEPCO's submission focuses solely on attributing blame to the deceased individuals and their immediate supervisors, without any meaningful introspection on managerial, systemic, or operational lapses that created the conditions for these accidents.

7.2.1. GEPCO Management Responsibility

7.2.1.1. GEPCO's assertion that all necessary PPE/T&P and trainings were "arranged" is grossly inadequate and misleading. The mere provision of safety equipment does not absolve the Licensee from responsibility when:

- There is no mechanism to ensure usage;
- Supervisory negligence is evident;
- Permit to Work (PTW) protocols are bypassed;



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- High-risk work is carried out unsupervised by unauthorized personnel;
- Unsafe and deteriorated equipment (e.g., bamboo ladders) are used.

7.2.1.2. These are not isolated/hidden errors by employees, they represent a complete failure of safety governance, operational oversight, and enforcement of basic safety systems.

7.2.2. Misrepresentation of Facts

7.2.2.1. GEPCO's narrative of all accidents being caused solely by "personal carelessness" is factually inaccurate and unsupported by the documented sequence of events. The Investigation Committee's findings clearly show that:

- Unauthorized work was tolerated by management.
- Sub-Divisional Officers and Supervisors failed to enforce PTW protocols.
- Field staff were unsupervised, were repeatedly left to operate alone in hazardous environments without any monitoring.
- Unsafe practices including no use of PPE by line staff across multiple sub-divisions, highlighting safety culture failure.
- Systemic lack of enforcement, monitoring, and accountability.

7.2.3. In case of Mr. Imran Khan (Public), GEPCO's claim that the accident was caused due to "ageing earthing", "rainwater accumulation from blocked sewerage" and "The current in the pole had never been reported by any one from the vicinity" is factually misleading and technically deceptive because:

7.2.3.1. A formal complaint regarding current leakage (PICT Ticket No. 23071212002012) was registered three days prior to the fatality. GEPCO's LM-I, Mr. Arshad Ali Shah, failed to identify the root cause, deteriorated consumer cable in direct contact with a metallic pole. The complaint was negligently marked as resolved despite an evident hazard. This is a gross dereliction of duty.

7.2.3.2. GEPCO admits the earthing of the pole had become ineffective due to ageing. This is a serious negligence. It is a mandatory legal requirement under NEPRA's Power Safety Code Section 7.21.2, 7.21.3 and 7.21.4 to maintain and verify integrity of fixed earthing/grounding by continuity test and resistance measurement as specified intervals.

7.2.3.3. Failure in Preventive Maintenance for LT line and earthing remained unaddressed for years despite the presence of supervisory staff and SDOs. This violates Power Safety Code Section 7.16.4.

7.2.3.4. GEPCO's submission attempts to invoke force majeure, which is wholly inapplicable. Foreseeable and preventable electrical hazards due to structural deterioration, lack of inspections, and complaint mishandling fall under clear negligence, not acts of God.



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7.2.4. In case of Mr. Sardar Wali (Public), GEPCO's claim that the victim's motorbike "had no front light" and that the hanging HT conductor "was not visible at night" is an abhorrent attempt to shift blame to a deceased victim. This is both unethical and legally invalid because:

7.2.4.1. The relay successfully tripped at the time of conductor breakage. However, it was manually reset and the feeder was re-energized without field verification. The live conductor remained energized on a public road for over 3 hours.

7.2.4.2. The Grid Station staff deliberately ignored the fault indication and energized the feeder without clearance.

7.2.4.3. The conductor was joined using incomplete strands instead of full-specification Rabbit Conductor. This serious technical malpractice which directly caused the breakage.

7.2.4.4. The incident resulted not from the victim's negligence as he was on his way on the road but from re-energization, use of substandard materials, and failure to respond to a life-threatening fault condition, all of which are violations of NEPRA's Power Safety Code and other applicable documents.

7.2.5. In case of Samar Abbas (Public), GEPCO's justification that a notice was issued to the illegal construction owner is entirely inadequate and legally deficient.

7.2.5.1. GEPCO failed to ensure delivery and follow-up of notices. The notices lacked critical information (no recipient signatures, no dispatch to police or local government). These were paper formalities, not serious preventive actions.

7.2.5.2. GEPCO installed a power connection in 2014 to the house under the 66 kV line, despite clear encroachment. This proves GEPCO's complicity and regulatory failure in allowing an illegal and hazardous construction to be energized.

7.2.5.3. Under NEPRA CSM Clause 12.3.6 & 12.3.7, GEPCO must disconnect supply to unsafe premises. GEPCO did not only fail to disconnect; it empowered the illegal premises.

7.2.6. In case of Ms. Rafia and Ms. Hania (Public), GEPCO's defense that the victims were "attending a marriage in close proximity" and that the flash occurred due to "internal fault" without deliberate negligence is legally void.

7.2.6.1. The direct cause of the fatal accident was the 200 KVA transformer which experienced a heavy flash due to intense pressure buildup, leading to oil leakage from the bushings and subsequent ignition. The fire was originated from the transformer and escalated due to petrol tanks of the parked motorcycles, resulting in severe burns to Ms. Rafia, her daughter Ms. Hania, and another girl, Ms. Ayat.

7.2.6.2. The 200 KVA transformer, manufactured in 2012, was reclaimed and installed at the site one and a half years ago. After 18 months, the transformer experienced a heavy



flash due to intense pressure buildup, leading to oil leakage from the bushings and subsequent fire. Internal issues such as degraded oil, winding failures, deteriorated insulation, or loose internal or external connections can cause electrical faults or short circuits, generating high temperatures and arcs that create rapid pressure buildup. The pressure release device on the transformer failed to adequately handle the pressure buildup caused by transformer faults, indicating poor maintenance of the transformer at the time of reclamation.

7.2.6.3. Rora fuses were found installed on the transformer at the time of the accident. Instead of standard fuses rated at 15 k for a 200 KVA transformer, copper wires with a diameter of 0.74 mm were used, which failed to provide adequate protection. It was also identified that J&U bolts were not installed to double pole platform for the said transformer.

8. Legal Violations/ Non-Compliance Confirmed

The NEPRA Act and the distribution license issued to the Distribution Company impose a statutory obligation on the company to follow the safety standards laid down by the Authority in the NEPRA Performance Standards (Distribution) Rules, Distribution Code, Power Safety Code 2021, and Consumer Service Manual. The investigation unequivocally confirms the following violations and non-compliances by the Distribution Company:

8.1. NEPRA Act, Section 21(2)f

The Licensee shall follow the performance standards laid down by the Authority for distribution and transmission of electric power, including safety, health and environmental protection instructions issued by the Authority or any Governmental agency;


8.2. Distribution License, Article 19 - Compliance with Health, Safety and Environmental Standards

The Licensee shall follow the standards laid down by the Authority for distribution and transmission of electric power, including health, safety, and environmental protection in accordance with the Power Safety Code and such other instructions as may be issued by any Federal or Provincial Agency.

8.3. NEPRA Performance Standards (Distribution) Rules

Rule 4(g), Overall Standards 7-(Safety (OS7):

- (i) *All distribution facilities of a distribution company shall be constructed, operated, controlled and remained in a manner consistent with the applicable documents.*
- (ii) *A distribution company shall ensure that its distribution facilities do not cause any leakage of electrical current or step potential beyond a level that can cause harm to human life, as laid down in the relevant IEEE/IEC Standards; prevent accessibility of live conductors or equipment; and prevent development of a situation due to breakdown of equipment which results in voltage or leakage current that can cause harm to human life, property and general public including without limitation, employees and property of the distribution company.*



- (iii) *A distribution company shall implement suitable, necessary, and appropriate rules, regulations and working practices, as outlined in its Distribution Code or applicable documents, to ensure the safety of its staff and members of the public. This shall also include suitable training for familiarity and understanding of the rules, regulations, practices, and training to use any special equipment that may be required for such purposes including without limitation basic first aid training.*

(iv)

8.4. Distribution Code

8.4.1. DDC 2.2 Distribution Design Code

Design Criteria for Distribution Lines These criteria shall apply to all distribution and sub-transmission lines and to be operated and maintained by the Licensee up to and including 132kV for both overhead lines and underground cables. The lines shall be designed and constructed in accordance with relevant provisions of IEC Standard or subsequent approved standards applicable to overhead lines and under-ground cables.

8.4.2. DDC 3 Design Principles

3.1 Specification of Equipment, Overhead Lines and Underground Cables

- a. The principles of design, manufacturing, testing and installation of Distribution Equipment, overhead lines and underground cables, including quality requirements, shall conform to applicable standards such as IEC, IEEE, Pakistan Standards or approved current practices of the Licensee.*
- b. The specifications of Equipment, overhead lines and cables shall be such as to permit the Operation of the Licensee Distribution System in the following manner;*
 - i. within the safety limits as included in the approved Safety Code of the Licensee or the relevant provisions of the Performance Standards (Distribution);*

8.4.3. DDC 4, Design Code- Earthing

.....The earthing of a distribution transformer, the neutral and body of the transformer should be connected to ground rods as per IEC and PSI Standards Design Specifications. Earthing of Consumer Service and its meter shall be as per design standards adopted by the Licensees; and consistent with IEC, and IEEE Standards. The earth resistance of the distribution transformers and HT/LT structures/poles shall not be more than 2.5Ω and 5Ω respectively.

8.4.4. SR 4, Safety Management Criteria

- a. All distribution facilities of a distribution company shall be constructed, operated, controlled and remained in a manner consistent with the applicable documents.*
- b. A distribution company shall ensure that its distribution facilities do not cause any leakage of Electrical Current or Step Potential beyond a level that can cause harm to human life, as laid down in the relevant IEEE/IEC Standards; prevent accessibility of live conductors or equipment; and prevent development of a situation due to breakdown of equipment which results in voltage or leakage current that can cause harm to human life, property and general public including without limitation, employees and property of the distribution company.*



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- c. *A distribution company shall implement suitable, necessary, and appropriate rules, regulations and working practices, as outlined in its Distribution Code or applicable documents, to ensure the safety of its staff and members of the public. This shall also include suitable training for familiarity and understanding of the rules, regulations, practices, and training to use any special equipment that may be required for such purposes including without limitation basic first aid training.*

8.4.5. SC 1, System Construction Code

Each Licensee shall prepare a comprehensive and exhaustive Operating / Construction manual in accordance with DISCOs/KESC approved standard based on relevant international standards like IEC, IEEE, and ASI, Consumer Service Manual, Grid Code and Distribution Code dealing with all material aspects to the design specifications, safe constructing practices, and sound engineering technical principles for construction of Distribution System and connections to consumer installation/ system. In particular due regard shall be had for the following but not limited to: -

- a. *Standard clearance of all voltage lines upto 132kV (vertical as well horizontal) from grounds, buildings, from each other, railway crossing, road crossing etc.*
- b. *Maximum and minimum length of span of the lines of all the voltages upto 132kV at different locations and different areas.*

8.4.6. PR 1 Protection System Practices and System Co-ordination

The Licensee shall follow suitable and necessary provisions regarding protection system practices and co-ordination such as the following but not limited to achieve the aims of proper functioning of the distribution system of the Licensee at all times:

- a. *Protection co-ordination of distribution system, sub-transmission system and system upto the metering point of the User (wherever applicable).*
- b. *Intentions to protect the Licensees lines, sub-station facility and equipment against the effects of faults.*

.....

- b. *Provide protective earthing devices.*

8.5. Power Safety Code 2021

7.12.5. *The licensee shall provide adequate training and supervision to ensure all employees and contractors understand the required steps as defined in the SOP/ work instructions and perform their work accordingly.*

7.14.2. *Identify, install and maintain protective system/ distance relays for abnormal conditions (short-circuits, overloading, lines fall on rocks or any dry surface, which may cause damage to people or property, etc.) including grounding of circuits, apparatus and infrastructures. ELCB (earth leakage circuit breaker), RCD (residual current device) and RCCB (residual current circuit breaker) shall be used as per design in circuits in order to prevent fires and shocks in electrical installations.*

7.14.3. *Protective relays and protection schemes set points/ sizes should be sufficient for the current rating to immediately 'blow' the fuse or trip the circuit breaker within the specified time, in case of fault or overcurrent.*



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7.15.1. All critical high risk activities including, transformer, overhead lines, dead apparatus/ lines, working at height, shall be performed safely in compliance to Licensee Operation/ Maintenance Procedure, SOP, or Manufacturer's manual.

7.15.2. Licensee shall implement all necessary precautions to avoid any leakage of electrical current or hazardous energy from its system/ infrastructure to harm human life.

7.15.5. Licensee shall ensure effective coverage of critical high-risk activities under close and direct supervision to reduce incidents/ near misses.

7.16.4. The Preventive Maintenance Plans should be scheduled based on inspection outcomes for each critical system/ equipment to increase their availability by reducing downtime caused by failure.

7.16.6. A document shall be developed that specifies the suitable procedures, testing of equipment, frequency of testing, acceptable limits and passing criteria of the tests of safety critical protection devices, instrumentation, interlocks, protection relays, breakers, controls, software and components.

7.20.1. Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)/ Tools & Plants (T&P) shall be in accordance to Hazard/ Risk Category and/ or PPE/ T&P Assessment study to provide protection from hazardous conditions.

7.20.4. Identify task specific PPE/ T&P in Task Risk Assessment/ JSA/ Permit to Work.

7.21.2. Install and maintain earthing/ grounding system (i.e., equipment, exposed steel structure/ pole along with stay wire).

7.22.1. Only electrically experienced, trained and authorized employees/ contractors shall perform electrical work against approved "Permit to Work" under the continuous direction and supervision of the job in-charge.

7.25.1. Licensee shall apply Permit to Work System and the work shall be carried out only when there is a valid permit to work issued for corrective and preventive maintenance activities, etc.

7.28.2. All poles, towers and structure shall be carefully inspected before climbing to assure that they are in a safe condition for the work to be performed and that they are capable of sustaining the additional or unbalanced stresses to which they will be subjected. The types of abnormalities that should be checked are cracks, damages, and deteriorations in poles, towers and structure and its foundation.

7.28.3. If poles, towers and structure are unsafe for climbing, they shall not be climbed until made safe by guying, bracing or use mobile elevated aerial platform, man-baskets, man-lift or bucket mounted vehicle instead of ladder.

8.6. Consumer Service Manual

Chapter 12 Safety and Security

12.2 Obligation of DISCO

DISCO shall monitor and implement the safety and security plan for consumers. The safety and security objectives can be achieved by adopting good engineering practice, including measures as described below:

.....

12.2.1 Operation and maintenance of DISCO distribution system /Network shall be carried out only by the DISCO authorized and trained personnel.



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12.2.2 DISCO system equipment, including overhead lines, poles/structures/towers underground cables, transformers, panels, cutouts, meters, service drops, etc. shall be installed and maintained in accordance with Grid Code, Distribution Code and other relevant documents.

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12.2.4 The earthing systems installed shall be dimensioned and regularly tested to ensure protection from shock hazards.

12.2.5 The steel structure installed on the public places shall be earthed at one point through steel/copper conductor, in accordance with the DISCO laid down procedures.

12.2.6 DISCO will issue a notice to the Consumer(s)/Person(s), in case of illegal construction, extension of building under or near the distribution/ transmission lines for violation of safety standards.

12.4 Some Useful Safety Tips

12.4.6 Safe clearances from electricity conductors and equipment (e.g., hazardous extension of balconies at the upper stories of houses in mohallas which comes within close proximity of electric lines) must be maintained to avoid electrocution.

12.4.9 In case of non-compliance of safety standards or already issued notices by DISCO to the consumer, local building department/concerned civic authority is responsible to demolish the illegal constructed/extended building near or under the transmission/ distribution lines after receiving information from concerned DISCO.

9. Authority Decision

9.1. Based on the investigation report and the foregoing analysis and findings, it is concluded that GEPCO has failed to submit a satisfactory response or solid factual evidence to the Show Cause Notice and is, therefore, concludes that GEPCO is in violation of the NEPRA Act, Distribution License, Performance Standards (Distribution) Rules 2005, Distribution Code, Power Safety Code 2021, and Consumer Service Manual. Despite considerable efforts done by GEPCO to strengthen its safety culture, critical gaps persist and need to be addressed under the law.


9.2. The investigation establishes beyond doubt that:

9.2.1. The "duty of care" lies with the Licensee, and the failure to ensure compliance establishes gross negligence under the law. There was a consistent failure at every level of line management and a complete absence of effective safety culture enforcement from GEPCO's top leadership downwards.

9.2.2. The fatalities were entirely preventable, if GEPCO's line management had properly planned the job, obtained the necessary permits to work, ensured effective supervision, conducted adequate preventive maintenance, and enforced the use of PPE. In this case, there were 100% chances of saving victims' lives.

9.2.3. The Licensee failed to submit any credible evidence to contradict the investigation's findings.

9.3. In light of the investigation findings, the evidence available on record, and GEPCO's failure to provide any solid factual evidence or legal defense in response to the Show Cause Notice, the Authority hereby rejects the Licensee's reply to the Show Cause Notice bearing No.




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NEPRA/DG(M&E)/LAD-03/3865 dated March 13, 2025. Consequently, the Authority imposes a fine of Rupees Seventeen Million Five Hundred Thousand (Rs. 17,500,000) on the Licensee under Section 27C(B) of the NEPRA Act, and the NEPRA (Fine) Regulations, 2021, for non-compliance with the NEPRA Act, Terms & Conditions of the License, Performance Standards (Distribution) Rules, 2005, Distribution Code, Power Safety Code 2021, Consumer Service Manual, and other applicable regulatory documents.


- 9.4. The Authority hereby directs the Licensee to compensate the family (next of kin) of Samar Abbas (Public) in accordance with the Licensee's Compensation Policy/Safety Manual, based on the identified findings and the negligence of line management who failed to fulfill their duties and responsibilities to protect public. Additionally, GEPCO shall arrange employment for the wife of the victim, Mr. Imran Khan, Ms. Samra Shahzadi (CNIC # 34101-7380121-8), to reduce the financial constraints faced by the bereaved family due to the loss of their bread earner. Submit a compliance report to NEPRA within sixty (60) working days.
- 9.5. Furthermore, GEPCO shall also be directed, under Section 27C(c) of the NEPRA Act, to implement the technical corrective and preventive measures communicated vide letter No. NEPRA/DG(M&E)/LAD-03/3864 dated March 13, 2025 to rectify the GEPCO identified deficiencies, ensuring the safety of the public, employees, contractors, and facilities.
- 9.6. The Licensee is hereby directed to deposit the fine amount of Rupees Seventeen Million Five Hundred Thousand (Rs. 17,500,000) in the designated bank account of the NEPRA within fifteen (15) days from the date of issuance of this Order. A copy of the paid instrument shall be submitted to the Registrar's Office for record and verification. Failure to comply with this directive within the stipulated period shall render the Licensee liable for recovery of the outstanding amount under Section 41 of the NEPRA Act, as arrears of land revenue, or through any other lawful means deemed appropriate by the Authority. Furthermore, the Authority reserves the right to initiate additional legal or regulatory proceedings against the Licensee for non-compliance with this Order.



Rafique Ahmed Shaikh
Member



Amina Ahmed
Member



Engr. Maqsood Anwar Khan
Member



Waseem Mukhtar
Chairman

